
Microsoft 365 phishing kits steal the session, not the password
The kits come with admin dashboards, track their victims and relay credentials in real time, in some cases supplemented by AI features. Huntress Labs analysed three of these kits in a sponsored article on BleepingComputer. The analysis shows why defence must not stop at password theft.
The difference is considerable. A stolen password fails at the second hurdle when MFA is active. A stolen session token, by contrast, opens a session in which login and MFA have already been completed.
Three techniques, one goal
Device code phishing
The victim signs in directly with the genuine identity provider. The attacker does not need to intercept any credentials, because they receive the resulting authorisation. To the user, the process feels like an ordinary sign-in, as they never see a third-party page.
Adversary-in-the-middle
The attacker relays the authentication flow in real time. This happens either via a fake login page or by intercepting an exchange within a legitimate application. The victim completes MFA, and the session ends up with the attacker. This invalidates the assumption that successfully completed MFA automatically makes a session trustworthy.
Token theft and replay
The attacker replays an intercepted sign-in token into an active session. Depending on the scope of permissions, this gives them access to the mailbox and other cloud resources. More serious still, the kits are not designed for one-off access. They give the attacker persistent access that extends far beyond the original phishing incident.
The three kits at a glance
EvilTokens
Huntress discovered EvilTokens in early 2026 as part of a device code phishing campaign. The kit abused the PaaS platform Railway to harvest and reuse tokens. According to the article, a joint operation by Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit and the FBI later led to the arrest of a suspected operator.
Knight Office
Knight Office is an AiTM kit that steals valid Microsoft 365 session tokens and feeds them into an operator console. From there, the attackers replay sessions and establish persistence across multiple accounts in the tenant.
Kali365
As a phishing-as-a-service offering, Kali365 bundles everything in a single control panel. Its operators capture tokens via device code flows and reverse proxy lures and replay them into running Microsoft 365 sessions. They maintain access and scale their activity with built-in AI features.
What defenders should do
Huntress divides its recommendations into detection and response.
Detection
Successful sign-ins from unknown cloud infrastructure are a warning sign. Defenders should specifically look for device code authentications and automated token refreshes. Newly registered devices, newly added authentication methods and unusual mailbox activity should also be scrutinised.
Context is decisive, because a single signal is rarely conclusive. Only the full sequence shows what actually happened. It runs from the phishing message through authentication, token issuance or token theft and device registration to mailbox activity.
Response
Containment must target the identity artefacts, not just the original phishing page.
- Revoke the refresh tokens of the affected accounts.
- Then remove unauthorised devices and Windows Hello credentials.
- Restrict or block device code authentication where business operations do not require it.
- Investigate mailbox access, forwarding rules and outgoing phishing emails.
- After containment, keep monitoring and specifically hunt for replay and re-entry, even if the phishing domain has long been offline.
Assessment
An incident of this kind is not over once the phishing domain has been taken down. As long as issued tokens, registered devices and added authentication methods remain in place, the attacker retains access. MFA remains a necessary hurdle, but it only protects the login. An organisation must secure and monitor the session that follows separately.
Source: “Inside Modern Phishing Kits Built to Steal Microsoft 365 Sessions” on BleepingComputer, 17 November 2026. The article is sponsored by Huntress Labs.



